Hyman Minsky may have contributed more of the financial determinants of investment 1 to our understanding instability than anyone since Keynes himself. In numerous articles and books Minsky (1975 Minsky ( ,1982 Minsky ( ,1986 has argued that in an environment of Keynesian uncertainty, expectations will be subject to endogenous cyclical instability and, as a result, investment will be cyclically unstable as well.
Though Minsky has chosen not to develop mathematical models to embody his theoretical insights, substantial progress along these lines has been made in recent years. In particular, formal models of Minsky cycles incorporating the interaction of investment and financial variables at the macro or general equilibrium level have been developed by Delli Gatti and Gallegati (1990) , Jarsulic (19891, Semmler (19871, Semmler and Franke (1991) , Skott (1991) and Taylor and O'Connell (1985) .
However, work on a theory of the enterprise investment decision that can provide a microeconomic foundation for such KeynesMinsky macromodels has been relatively neglected.
One reason for this lack of progress at the micro level may be Minsky's adoption of Tobin's q-theory in which there is no independent firm decision-making process. Another is that the core assumptions of a Keynesian world make the process of formalization difficult. As explained in Section I of this paper, a Keynesian investment theory requires not only that the future be unknowable, but that investment be substantially irreversible as well. Either assumption considered in isolation 2 presents substantial analytical difficulty; taken together they are formidable.' But real-world firms do accumulate illiquid capital in conditions of Keynesian uncertainty. Our challenge, then, is to construct a tractable theory of the investment decision that incorporates these two Keynesian assumptions. This paper offers one attempt to meet this challenge.
Section I presents an overview of the model, which is fully specified in Section II. Section III discusses the firm's . optimal investment strategy, while Section IV discusses the comparative static properties of that policy. Section V then explains how the model can be used to micro found a Minsky cycle.
I. An Overview of the Model
This section presents an overview of the firm's investment decision. For convenience, all notation is defined in Table I .
We turn first to the characterization of the enterprise as a . behavioral agent. Keynes and Minsky have taken opposite positions with respect to owner-manager relations.' Minsky generally accepts a variant of Tobin's q-theory in which owners and managers are assumed to be identical economic agents: there is no independent enterprise decision-making process. Keynes, on the other hand, insists on the qualitative differentiation of stockholders (and financial investors generally) managers.
and enterprise
We follow Keynes's lead here. His approach is, in fact, consistent with the spirit of Minsky's model. Since Minsky rejects the neoclassical approach to uncertainty, it would be logical for him to assume that distinct agents such as owners and managers have both incomplete and asvmmetric information. As Keynes stressed, managers know more about the firm and its environment than do the firm's stockholders.3 Moreover, as discussed in Crotty (1990) , there are compelling reasons to assume that owners and managers have qualitatively different objective functions as well as different planning horizons.4
The theory of the semiautonomous firm is most highly developed in the managerial and behavioral theoretical tradition.
We accept the standard assumption of this literature that management seeks the reproduction, growth and security of the enterprise itself, and through these goals, its own income, status and job security.' Stockholder and creditor interests are not objectives pursued by management. Rather, they represent a potential threat to management's decision-making autonomy and a constraint on the pursuit of its objectives. To protect its control of the enterprise, the firm must pay dividends sufficient to prevent a share holders' revolt or a corporate raid and interest payments that prevent creditors from constraining managerial autonomy.
More formally, we assume that the firm maximizes a preference function O(G,S) where G reflects the growth-profit objectives of the enterprise and S embodies management's concern for the financial security of the firm and thus for its own decision-making autonomy --it financial securitv-autonomv objective. Both G and S are functions of the capital stock trajectory over management's long-term planning horizon. We make G a function of two subgoals: R', the present value of the future earnings the firm expects its capital stock to generate (which depends on the pattern of future demand and cost conditions it expects); and K', the average size of the capital stock over the planning horizon --an index of the size-status of the firm.6 S is an index of the likelihood that management will experience a threat to its autonomy. This threat exists because growth can only be obtained through the accumulation of illiquid capital and capital accumulation must be financed. Debt finance creates explicit, legally-binding cash-flow commitments to creditors. But even internal funding and stock floatation create implicit cash-flow commitments to shareholders. When investment is irreversible, these financial commitments are irreversible as well. When expectations are disappointed, the firm cannot simply repay its creditors with the proceeds from the resale of the assets they financed. If commitments to stockholders cannot be met out of the future operating profits generated by invested capital, management may experience a threat to its decisionmaking autonomy; if commitments to creditors are not met, the firm might go bankrupt.
In a Keynesian-Minskian world, financial commitments to creditors are relatively certain while expected profits are not,
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To make sensible decisions about the accumulation of long-lived illiquid capital, then, the firm must form expectations of cash flows well into the future. But about such matters, Keynes told USI '*We simply do not know". When investment is irreversible and the future is unknowable, irreversible mistakes of serious maqnitude are Possible. It is the irreversibility of investment which creates the "legacy of past contracts@' (Minsky, 1982, p. 63) that constrain current investment and threaten managerial autonomy. Thus, while accumulation is necessarv (to achieve growth), it is simultaneously danserous for management.
To specify S more concretely, let X, be defined as the interest plus dividend payments necessary to preserve managerial autonomy (i.e., as the costs of autonomy) and let Z, be defined as the ex post gross profits available to meet these payments in period t.
A threat to autonomy will arise when (&-X,) is expected to be small; a crisis will occur if (IS,-X,) is expected to be negative.
The firm will want to avoid investment decisions which cause expectations of (xt-X,) to become uncomfortably low. Suppose that we provisionally adopt the neoclassical assumption that the firm can, with complete confidence, form subjective probability distributions relating future profit flows to the size of the -capital stock in each future period. Denote the expected distribution of K given K (or IcIK) in any period as f,. The perceived likelihood of an autonomy crisis would then be given by F t, the cumulative probability that ? ' c T c , < X,, and S(F,) would then represent the firm's index of expected safety in t. Under this 6 treatment of uncertainty, management's estimate of the likelihood of an autonomy crisis in period t would depend on: (1) the financial structure of the firm at the end of period (t-l) --.
Minsky's "legacy of past contractstV; (2) f,, management's subjective probability distribution for IC, given its choice of Kt; and (3) the value of K, selected by the firm. Since today's investment decision affects future expected net revenues, the future costs of autonomy and the future financial structure of the firm, it inevitablv alters the relation of K to both G and S in future Periods. Thus, the capital accumulation problem confronting management is inherently dynamic.
There are two reasons why this formulation of the problem is inadequate for our purposes. First, if we were to include the complete set of functions S(F,), S(F,+l), . . . S(F,) in the objective function, the dynamic effects of today's investment decision would be extraordinarily complex because the firm's future financial commitments would be a complicated function of the K trajectory with an exponentially increasing number of stochastic terms: this formulation is analytically intractable.
Second, as noted, it incorporates a neoclassical treatment of uncertainty.
In Appendix B (which should be consulted after reading Section II and Appendix A), we show that there does exist a tractable static variant of the firm's investment decision under Keynesian uncertainty that is equivalent to the full dynamic model just enumerated under a set of three assumptions that are 7 both realistic and consistent with a Keynesian worldview.'
First, we assume that the firm adopts a sequential decisionmaking process in which it tentatively chooses an optimal capital stock trajectory each period but only orders the first period's capital goods at that time. It then updates its forecasts of future demand and cost conditions using data generated during the first period and re-evaluates the G(K) and S(K) functions before repeating the process. When errors can be extremely costly and when the forecasts on which beyond-period optimal capital stock decisions are based may be dramatically revised in the light of data generated in the current period, management will not want to commit itself beyond its "next best step" (Vickers, 1987, p. 8) on the basis of current data.
Second, the assumption of Keynesian uncertainty suggests that as the planning horizon lengthens, the firm's confidence in its ability to predict the precise form of the effects of today's investment on future growth and safety declines dramatically. We incorporate this phenomenon in our model by assuming: (1) that the firm can construct a neoclassical-type subjective probability distribution describing the effect of K on expected gross profits for the coming three to five year corporate planning cycle that we take as the length of a period*; and (2) that the firm does not believe that it has enough reliable information to fully specify all future S(F,) functions, so it cannot optimize over the beyond-first-period effects of current investment on the S function.
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Third, we confine our analysis to the case where, in the G function, the firm expects a constant and non-negative time rate of growth of its product demand curve. Note carefully that assumptions two and three imply that the optimal stock is expected to grow each period and that there is no incentive in the model to over-invest now in anticipation of future growth.
Thus, the optimal stocks of capital in future periods are independent of this period's stock and of each other.
These assumptions simplify the problem, but they also imply that S is a function of F, alone: the firm is oblivious to the existence and not just to the precise form of the beyond-first- 
(where R is expected net revenue, I is net investment, K" is the initial capital stock, the relation between I and K is treated implicitly as K( I;K'), and all variables are current) is a sensible Keynesian-Minskian specification because the firm has: a long-term planning horizon; is aware that its current investment decision may have important future effects on safety and growth; This brings us to the core of management's decision-making problem: the orowth-safety tradeoff. Were the firm to undertake only those investment projects with very high expected profits, it might be able to raise G and S simultaneously. But as it pushes capital accumulation to the point which maximizes G, it will accept projects with decreasing expected profitability and/or higher risk. It will, at the margin, lower S by raising F (the likelihood that IC will fall short of X in the coming period) and increasing D' (and thus the likelihood a long-term autonomy crisis).l* On the other hand, if the firm minimizes its vulnerability to autonomy crises by accepting only the safest projects, it will forego.expected growth opportunities. We explore this growth-safety tradeoff in detail below.
Investment, then, is a function of: (1) the determinants of the relation between expected profits and K; (2) the determinants of the relationship between expected safety and K; and (3) management's relative preference for growth versus safety. All three of these relations are subject to Keynesian-Minskian endogenous instability. After deriving the comparative static properties of the optimal investment decision in Section IV, we demonstrate that Minsky's stylized facts describing the typical business cycle will indeed induce cyclical investment instability in the model described here and fully specified in Section II.
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II. The Model
We complete our modelling of the firm's investment problem by more fully specifying the R,K,F and D/ functions (1). In the remainder of the paper, the superscript to end-of-last period values.
Expected net revenues, R(I;fi), is specified as in equation zero refers the difference between expected gross profits, 1sg, and the present discounted value (PDV) of debt payments (costs of autonomy abstracting from dividend payments for the moment), A, associated with current gross investment:
The level of A is determined by the financing mechanism of the firm. We assume that the representative firm is a net debtor with no liquid assets and with only two sources of investment finance: the internal funds or cash-flow carried over from last period and new debt in the event that gross investment expenditures exceed cash flow. When cash flow exceeds gross investment outlays, the residual goes to debt reduction. All debt is assumed to be variable rate consoles.
Since gross investment expenditure, PKIg, is either debt financed or financed from cash-flow residuals which would otherwise be cost, direct used for debt reduction, the additional interest and/or opportunity, associated with P'crg is rPKIg where PK is the price of a unit of capital. A is the present discounted value of rPKIg. A formal specification of the financing and dividend payout mechanisms and thier implications 12 for the debt structure and R function is contained in Appendix A.
In order to avoid the reintroduction of future effects into Problem (11, dividends are defined as a percentage, p, of current gross profits minus last period's interest payments (see Appendix A). Further, to simplify the expression of the optimizing conditions associated with (l), dividends are treated as a seperate entity from the other costs of autonomy --A, the PDV of debt payments.
ng(K(I;p)) can be further decomposed as follows. We assume a fixed-coefficient, constant variable cost production function and a downward-sloping demand curve:
C7=b where Q is output, P is expected output price, U is expected unit variable cost and 77 is a constant. We further assume that P, < 0 and P,, s 0. Given, these assumptions we can alternatively The firm's size subobjective is simply specified by K(I;K'), the size of the firm's real capital stock, and thus needs no further elaboration. In addition, K, = 1.
We turn now to the S subobjectives, F and D'. F is the probability that 1~ < X --the likelihood of an autonomy crisis.
F can be;xpressed as:
where: f 4s the firm's subjective pseudo-probability distribution of x, the uncertain gross profit flows; ~cg(K(I;fl>) and u2 are the mean and variance of x; a is the lower limit of YC, X is the firm's current financial obligations (costs of autonomy) as distinct from the present value of the costs of autonomy, A. For ease of exposition, we assume that x is distributed uniformly.13
Given that f is uniform, a = a(@(K); u2) with aa -=l and a+ *<o
The sign of F,=(X,-?rf) f depends on the relationship between (1+x: and X, which is similar, but not identical, to the relation between x7 and A,. If (l-p,xq', x,, FI>'O.
In the case where xF>O, a one unit increase in I can increase expected gross profit flows by either more or less than the increase in current autonomy payments and thus either decrease or increase the probability of short-term financial strife.
As noted above, D/--D-8 where B is the product of f and (PXK(I;fl), f is the maximum leverage ratio considered safe or prudent by management, and PKK (I;K") represents the value of the firm's assets.
L7
Since E=-,
PKK
it can be thought of as the 14 maximum acceptable debt to debt-plus-equity ratio. As noted (fn.
121, an increase in Ig will always raise D by more than the marginal increase in the "admissible" level of long-term debt emanating from the increase in the firm's K. Thus, investment always initiallv increases the firm's long-term debt dependencv and therefore reduces securitv.
In order to simplify notation, we respectively define a series of vectors that contain the relevant exogenous parameters for the R, X, a, D and 1s functions: F,F,g,E and d. These vectors are fully specified in Appendix A and include the dividend payout rate, the interest rate, the price of a unit of capital, the depreciation rate, the maximum acceptable debt to debt-plus-equity ratio, and the initial values of the stocks of capital and debt, and last period's profit flow.
Assuming that there are no costs of adjustment, the specification of the firm's investment decision is given by: Given our above discussion of the sign indeterminacy of F,
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and R, and thus S, and G,, the nature of the tradeoff is undetermined. However, it is shown in Appendix C that the first order conditions for (3) and the assumptions that PO< 0 and P,sOt restrict S,< 0 and Gr> 0 in the neighborhood of equilibrium: an investment-induced G-S tradeoff is operational.
The mechanics of the tradeoff are straightforward. A one unit increase in I increases G, and thus utility, either through a simultaneous increase in both firm size and net revenues or an increase in firm size that outweighs, in utility units, a decline in net revenues. At the same time, marginal I decreases S either through a simultaneous increase in the probability of short-term financial strife and long-term debt dependency or an increase in long-term debt dependency that outweighs, in utility units, the decline in F.
The dependence of 0 in equation (3a) on multiple objectives (G and S) and subobjectives (R,K,F, and D') requires that management's relative subjective ranking of these objectives and subobjectives be made explicit. For simplicity, it is assumed that S and G are linear in their arguments:
S FF = +,I= S,I= Gsuz= G,= GxR= 0. In contrast, the relative preference ordering for G and S is variable and endogenous. It is assumed that O,= O,= 0, while O,,<O: the firm's imperative to grow is a constant unyielding commitment that is independent of the size of the firm, while the firm's response to financial security and uncertainty is variable. In particular, at lower levels of financial security management responds to the threat of 16 encroachment on its decision-making autonomy and the possible threat to the firm's immediate and long-run survival by choosing an investment/debt strategy which focuses on restoring financial security even at the expense of maintaining or promoting the firm's growth objective. A financially fragile firm will sacrafice potential growth to lower the probability of crisis.
As in the credit rationing literature, financial structure influences investment. I is inversely related to the debt-equity ratio. However, in this Keynesian model credit affects I through the demand side. Note that the intensity of the G-S tradeoff is variable. Ceteris paribus, at higher levels of I (and thus higher levels of G and lower levels of S) the relative preference for security increases. In general the effect on I' and K* of a one unit change in any parameter, p, (with the exception of Ko, discussed below) can be expressed as (5) where 0, =0 is invoked, IHI is the second order condition in equation (4), and O* is written as SpOss. Given that IHI<O, the sign of c depends on the sign of three separate effects:
d. O&-, OsSrpI and SISpOss. These effects respectively represent:
(1) the change in investment-induced increases in growth objectives evaluated in utility terms by'0,: where XT== f&(l+pPm>.
If demand increases such that P-2 0 and &>Or then G&O, S,,>O and S,>O implying that g> 0 da * A rise in a stimulates I three ways. First, it increases the marginal return to growth --marginal gross profits are increased because the additional output is sold at a higher a, marginal costs remain the same, and the marginal decline in price when Q grows is either unaffected or reduced. Second, it reduces the marginal decline in safety because F is reduced. Third, it increases the level of S through higher gross profits that reduce F, and thereby lower the weight on the investment-induced decline in S. All three effects reduce the intensity of the G-S tradeoff and result.in optimal trades of investment-induced reductions in S in favor of investment-induced increases in G. Thus, I
increases. As can be seen in Figure II , the first (or demand) effect shifts the G, curve to the right while the latter effects (s_> c and S,> 0) both shift the -+S1
G
This result is important on
On the micro level, it shows how curve to the right.
both the micro and macro levels.
shifts in demand and cost functions change I demand. On the macro level, it provides a feedback mechanism through which macroeconomic variables shift the firm's demand and cost functions and thus influence microeconomic profitability and I.
We next consider the effect of Da, the initial level of debt, on I'. Changes in Do affect I in our model because they change S. Since S,, (the only shift parameter (in Figure II) that is operable in this case) is negative, dI/dW<O. An increase in Do raises D and X and thus reduces the level of financial security by increasing both F and 0'. As a result the preference weight assigned to the investment-induced reduction in S is increased.
The unknowability of the future is reflected in u2, a measure of short-term uncertainty, and E, an index of perceived long-term uncertainty. which reduces the probability of all undesirable profit outcomes (or all n<X), lowers the probability of the net additional undesirable profit outcomes associated with F,>O. Thus ,,~<o, S,,,>O and the firm's utility maximizing opportunities are enhanced as uncertainty rises. For the very fragile firm, S,,>O --security actually rises as the level of uncertainty increases.
In this case the reduction in the probability of existing undesirable outcomes outweighs the addition of new undesirable outcomes and F&>O: the only hope for a firm that faces relatively certain bankruptcy lies in the additional desirable outcomes associated with an increase in u2 which provide a chance, however slim, for survival. Put differently, a firm on the verge of bankruptcy will take an investment gamble that an ordinary firm would not consider. Ceteris paribus, this increase in security induces an increase in I.
Given that u2, E and xg or Q are all conditional on the existing information set, additional adverse information generated by the passage of time might (depending on the exact nature of expectation formation) reduce Q and ,!? and increase 02, thus causing a reduction in I. In addition, the sequential nature of decision making in our model implies that a reversal in x in subsequent periods would result in a revival of investment.
Thus our model can reproduce the '*waiting to invest" result of the irreversible investment literature.
We now consider the effect of a change in P, the initial stock of illiquid capital, on I' and K'. As these developments depress I*, desired investment, actual investment expenditures will be sustained for some time by the need to complete unfinished projects. Thus, the need to borrow, even at high interest rates will continue right into the recession. I* will now be ready to collapse, leading the economy into a downward spiral of uncertain, historically contingent dimensions. For example, if 15 is low enough and Do is high enough, or the typical firm is financially "fragile," a financial panic might take place.
The model developed here can also reproduce the other phases of Minsky's business cycle. And its set of investment determinants is rich enough to enable it to "explain" business cycles with distinct patterns. Of course, we have paid a price for this richness. The theory is too complex to find incorporation in a formal, mathematical business cycle model and the problem as we have posed it seems to elide any simple, mathematically elegant formulation. Nevertheless, we believe that the benefits outweigh the costs. And we hope that our efforts will stimulate others to develop more attractive models of the enterprise investment decision in a Keynes-Minsky setting. where 6 is the rate of depreciation and (PKI+6PKX)=PKIg. The interest cost, direct and/or opportunity, associated with PKIg is rPKIQ=rPKI=r6PKX which is equivalent to X, the current cost of autonomy in a world without dividends.
The application of present valuation rules to rPKIg given the independence of X' in successive periods leads to the particular form of A in equation (2). Abstracting for the moment from dividend payments,
A=rPKI+i5PKX=r(Do-Y)
While the independence of succesive X's implies the independence of replacement investment (6X), it also establishes a dependence between net investment (I) in successive periods --a one unit increase in current period I must reduce I in the next period by an equivalent amount in order to preserve the independence of the K's . Thus, the current financing of 6K generates an infinite stream of debt payments (rap%) with a present value of 6PKK, while the net effect of financing I is limited to a one time, current period, debt payment rPxI --the future stream of debt payments associated with I is offset by the equivalent reduction in the debt payments associated with I in the next period.
Therefore, when dividends are zero the present discounted value of : (1) debt payments associated with Ig; and (2) total debt payments or total current costs of autonomy, X, reduces respectively to rPKI+&PKK and rPkI+6PKK+r(Do-Y) where r (D"-Y) can be interpreted as a onetime fixed or sunk cost of fl generated from the carry-over debt (Do-Y) associated with P.
Finally, to preserve the consistency of the static problem in equation (1) with the dynamic problem under our simplifying assumption (in Appendix B) requires that expected dividend payments be defined as a percent of gross profits minus last period's interest payments rather than current interest payments:
p (A"-rD") where O<p<l. We model dividends in this manner to avoid the reintroduction of minor future effects --R' would depend on both the D and K trajectories --that could disrupt the independence of K in successive periods. Including expected dividend payments as a current cost of autonomy implies that
X=rP'CI+r6PxK(I;KO)+r(Do-Y)+p(ng-rDo)
and that Y=x"-Xo=xo-~Do-~(~o-r~o). Substituting for Y in equation (Al) results in a fuller specification of current debt:
D=(l+(l-p)r)D"+PKI+bPKK(I;KO)-(1-0)x0
Incorporating dividend payments and the cash-flow relation, Y, expected net revenues --expected gross profit flows minus expected present value of the costs of autonomy associated 1" --can now be fully specified as the with R= (1-P) Ag(K(r;P) ) -[rPKI+8PKK(I;KO) +(1-P) (r(DO ( The firm's full optimization problem becomes equation (3) subject to the specifications of R, A, X and D in this appendix. implying that the maximization of (82) (2) hold, a strorg set of conditions is met for GTIILi \ 9
and ST/I*) ( 0.
Proof:
Case I
Vnder the assumptions on the demand curve (P 2 ' 0 and r 2~ L g), STT y 0 and GIT ' 0. Thus condition 11, hclds. TJsinq realistic values for 5 and r --6 = .08 and r = .l --condition (2! requires that the response of G for a one dollar increase in PKK is l/14 of the response in G for a one dollar increase in F!. Thus. a mild preference for the size subobjective is suffici-rnf to satisfy this strong condition. In COmpariSOn to GK = 9, the existence of a preference for size implies that I, is greater --3r-l a _ the basis of G objectives alone, the Try1,i is smaller and is more likely + is more likely to be less than I?. EecqTnizinq that it is possible for IX L IIT xLf_ lnw levels of I !hi,gh In recent gears neoclassical financial economists concerned -.A.~?, the agency costs associated with conflicts betr;een owners and manac;er; have adopted a traditional "managerial" view of the objective function of the enterprise. For example. Jensen t1988) has argued that "manaaers have incentives to expand their firms beyond the size that maximizes shareholder wealth. Growth increases managers' power b:r increasina the resouces under their control, and changes in management -ompensation are positively related to growth. Moreover. the tenden,::: 5f firms to reward middle managers through promotion rather than t,hrouah year-to-year bonuses also creates an organizational bias tl-zzari Trowth to supply the new positions that such promotion-haze,? reward systems require" (1388, p. 25) . For a general discussion of the effects of owner-manager conflict cln the investment decision of the firm, see Crotty (1990). Lazonick's (19911 recent history of the evolution of the srganizational structure of the business enterprise argues that WE business has been "managerial" rather than neoclassical in t'orm and behavior since the 1920s.^_ _"_ Indced. he refers to the US economic =,:;,,~m from the 1920s to the Frcsent as "managerial capitalism." %he ioint maximization of R' xor,-Ah objective and I<' best represents man;caem.?n: : because the maximization of l?' with minimum size ;z6he acrumulation of a larq productiv e capacity with poor profit pt-osp?cts ,do no {Tuarantce long-run survival in a dynamic cemFetiti-:s 3n7ironment.
Laryer firms have easier access to financial markets. xnd econc,mics of scale in research and development and in markzrir,:?.
Fkally. control of a lk3rF:e firm confers incon?, status and power .ZR management. See Donaldson and Lorsch (i3E?) for raze-study: evidence chat supports our specification of the firm's <growth objective.
-It is Tommon in the neoclassical investment literature to reduce 1 dynamic problem to a static one. US_e, for example, Jorgenson's 123 rents? price mcdel. 2rrch models are static because the az3um~ lzlnz SF perfect .:ertzinty and!.3r in-zctnent reversibilit:,-e1Fminat.e on tie other i-1; u-i:.-intertempcral profit tradcctf. Our reduction. ILci -C. clsults from the combined assumptions of illiquid capital anr Keynesian uncertainty. ' We specify the firm's in this short-term expectations cf Frofitability -day solely in order to make the anallrtics of our model tractable. Under Keynesian uncertainty rational aaents could never formulate such a complete distribution and, even if they could, they -4ould never have complete confidence that it represented the whole truth about likely future state of the world. Since all such forecast3 are built on hopes, fears and social conventions of various kinds, they can never attain even the subjective status of knowledg?.
'Even so, the model as is, constitutes a more Keynesian than neoclassical formulation of the problem because the illiquidity of capital causes the investment decision to be constrained by the existing financial structure of the firm.
lONote that thi3 formulation of the index of long-term -rulnerability stresses the threat to autonomy from creditors and excludes the threat posed by shareholders.
'%Jote that while D chancres 310~1~ over time, 6 is subject to dramatic shifts at times of unforeseen-chancre. 3uch a3 the &set of an llnexpected recession or a financial market panic, when events reveal that the firm's expectations -3ere in serious error. Investment .iemand itaelt -dould then experience dramatic 3hirt3 as dell.
12c ,uppcse the firm sets 6 bv choosin= a taraet ratio of debt t0 Debt-plus-equity. A dollar used-to buy capital Goods will raise P by .one dollar because it was financed either by borrowing or by the use ,of internal fund3 that could have been used to retire debt instead. Eut D Xl1 rise by a fraction equal to the target debt to debt-plus-equity ration. Since this fraction must be less ttian one, D' gill ri3e.
12,-or II is distributed normally, qualitatively similar results are found. Eee n. 15 for a comparison of comparative static results under these two alternative assumptions on f. l%hile thi3 derivation of JTTI invokes the production function assumption that Q,, = 0, all derivations and proor'z that follow hold for the more general case zhere Q,, i 0. shown to hold in all cases for realistic parameter values. In addition dI!da' ' 0 requires as 3 strong condition that IIg ? rF"'l-ES and X < lTg -.T. A technical appendix that derives these results iz available upon request from the authors.
